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Route selection is governed by various strategies which often allow minimizing the
required memory capacity. Previous research showed that navigators primarily remember
information at route decision points and at route turns, rather than at intersections
which required straight walking. However, when actually navigating the route or indicating
directional decisions, navigators make fewer errors when they are required to walk straight.
This tradeoff between location memory and route decisions accuracy was interpreted as
a “when in doubt follow your nose” strategy which allows navigators to only memorize
turns and walk straight by default, thus considerably reducing the number of intersections
to memorize. These findings were based on newly learned routes. In the present study,
we show that such an asymmetry in route memory also prevails for planning routes within
highly familiar environments. Participants planned route sequences between locations
in their city of residency by pressing arrow keys on a keyboard. They tended to ignore
straight walking intersections, but they ignored turns much less so. However, for reported
intersections participants were quicker at indicating straight walking than turning. Together
with results described in the literature, these findings suggest that a “when in doubt follow
your nose strategy” is applied also within highly familiar spaces and might originate from
limited working memory capacity during planning a route.
Keywords: wayfinding, strategy, spatial cognition, route knowledge, spatial representation, spatial learning,
memory retrieval, memory load
INTRODUCTION
Navigating through the environment is crucial for many species
to visit a known food source or to find the way back home.
Typically, there are multiple ways to reach a destination, so navi-
gators can apply several strategies to choose between alternative
routes. Wayfinding strategies interact with the memory of an
environment (Allen, 1999; Raubal and Worboys, 1999; Wiener
et al., 2009). For example, in order to directly approach a non-
visible goal via an unknown shortcut, metric “survey” knowl-
edge about the environment is required. However, for deciding
between familiar routes, such metric knowledge is not necessarily
required (Wiener et al., 2009).
One strategy to reduce working memory load during route
planning is to exploit hierarchical representations of an environ-
ment (Hirtle and Jonides, 1985; Richter et al., 2011) and apply
fine-to-coarse route planning (Wiener and Mallot, 2003; Wiener
et al., 2004). Within this stepwise strategy, navigators do not plan
a route from A to B complete with all decisions in between, but
rather plan the route first from A to an area in which B is located.
As soon as navigators reach this target area, the remaining route
is planned in detail. Consistent with such a strategy, navigators
approach the target area as directly as possible.
Route strategies may not only reduce working memory load,
but also long-term memory requirements. Sticking to a visible
path, street, or corridor is a useful strategy within city or building
environments (Allen, 1999). This strategy allows navigators to
focus on decision points along their route while largely discarding
further route information, as they will follow the path anyway.
Consistent with such a strategy, objects located at decision points
are mentioned more frequently and are recognized better than
objects located elsewhere as shown in studies using familiar envi-
ronments, newly learned virtual environments, routes displayed
on a map, and routes presented via slides (Appleyard, 1969; Cohen
and Schuepfer, 1980; Aginsky et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2002; Janzen,
2006).
This strategy of following a given path by default can unburden
the required long-term memory by focusing on decision points.
These requirements can be further reduced when applying a
“when in doubt follow your nose” strategy, which is walking
straight at decision points by default due to not knowing any
better strategy. This strategy aids in remembering not all of the
decision points, but only a subset of them (i.e., turns), thus
further reducing the required memory while still being able to
reach a goal. Computationally this approach is similar to dividing
a route sequence by turns and chunking each turn with the
straight walking before (Klippel et al., 2003; Richter and Klip-
pel, 2005). Evidence for the “when in doubt follow your nose”
strategy comes from an experiment asking participants to learn
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routes through a photorealistic, unknown virtual environment
(Meilinger et al., 2012). Participants showed better memory for
turns than for straight walking intersections as indicated by errors
in drawing the routes. However, despite their better recall of
turning intersections, they made fewer errors at straight walking
intersections than at turning intersections when navigating the
route or when indicating correct route continuation at randomly
presented intersection pictures. The “when in doubt follow your
nose” strategy explains these effects: participants focused on turn-
ing intersections and showed preference in remembering them.
They did not remember straight walking intersections as well, but
when asked for route decisions they more often reacted correctly
at them, because walking straight was their default reaction.
Evidence for this “when in doubt follow your nose” strategy
was obtained within an unfamiliar environment which consisted
of single routes learned through video projection without motoric
walking. It is an open question, whether such a strategy can also
be observed within a highly familiar environment navigated in
daily life, where routes are self-selected by the participants and not
provided by the experimenter. In order to examine this question
we reanalyzed data from another experiment (Meilinger et al.,
2013). In this experiment, Tübingen residents were teleported
to intersections within a photorealistic model of Tübingen, self-
localized, and indicated the decision sequence along an imagined
travel from their current location to a target location by pressing
arrow keys on a keyboard. Within the present study, we compared
errors along these route sequences between turning and straight
walking intersections as well as the speed with which these route
decisions were indicated. If the “when in doubt follow your nose”
strategy is also prevalent within highly familiar environments we
predicted there would be better recall for turning than for straight
walking intersections. This is because if participants focus on
turns they should forget them less often than straight walking.
Additionally, for the remembered route decisions, we predicted
quicker indication of straight walking than of turning. Straight
walking is the default reaction and if executed, this execution
should be easier than other reactions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Twenty-three naïve participants (13 male) living in Tübingen
for more than 2 years (M = 7.7; SD = 5.9), aged 18–50 years
(M = 28.5; SD = 7.7) were recruited from a subject database and
participated in exchange for monetary compensation after giving
informed consent. They lived for at least 2 years in Tübingen
(M = 7.7; SD = 5.9). The experiment was approved by the ethics
committee of the University Clinics Tübingen.
We used Virtual Tübingen, a highly realistic virtual model of
Tübingen, Germany (Figure 1; http://virtual.tuebingen.mpg.de;
van Veen et al., 1998). Participants saw the model in horizontal
perspective through a Kaiser SR80 head mounted display (HMD)
while sitting on a swivel chair. Fog occluded adjacent intersec-
tions. We tracked head movements and rendered a stereo view
of the virtual environment with a field of view of 63 (hori-
zontal) × 53 (vertical) in real time. Participants typed in route
sequences with the arrow keys of a custom keyboard resting on
their legs (Figure 1). For further technical details regarding the
setup please refer to Frankenstein et al. (2012).
In every trial, participants faced a start location, looked
around, and confirmed recognition of location and orientation
by pressing space. The written name of the target location (e.g.,
a tavern, train station, fire hall) appeared on the HMD-screen.
To enter the route sequences leading to target locations, partic-
ipants turned to face the initial direction of their chosen route,
pressed the “up/forward” arrow key on the keyboard, entered the
remaining sequence, and finished by pressing “space.” A sequence
might look the following: “forward, left, right, forward, left.”
Participants were explicitly told to report all navigation decisions
(i.e., to include decisions to remain on the direction) at all
intersections along the route, but to ignore gateways and dead-
ends. Participants always remained at the starting location and
were not moved through Virtual Tübingen, i.e., they faced the
same scene as if they were standing at that start location during
the whole recall procedure. Participants controlled inter-trial
intervals themselves, and did not receive any feedback. They had
successfully identified start and target locations on snapshots dis-
FIGURE 1 | Setup. (A) A snapshot from Virtual Tübingen with fog hiding adjacent intersections. (B) A participant equipped with a HMD and a keyboard is typing
in a route sequence. Reprinted from Meilinger et al. (2013), with permission from Elsevier.
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playing only locally visible landmarks before the experiment. Start
and target locations encompassed commonly known locations
within Tübingen. They were chosen to cover multi-alternative,
overlapping routes. All routes started within the area covered by
Virtual Tübingen, but targets came from a larger area. For a map
of start and target locations please refer to Frankenstein et al.
(2012).
We tested participants’ spatial memory in two imagined
perspectives, every participant entered each sequence twice. In
the walk perspective, participants were asked to indicate route
sequences as if they were walking this route (i.e., in ground
perspective). In the bird perspective, participants were asked to
imagine looking down on the city and report the route as if
looking on a map (i.e., include terms like “up” and “down” on
the map). This variation was used to infer the reference frames
underlying route memory in the previous study. The observed
advantage for reporting from walk perspective indicates that
participants represented the routes not within a single reference
frame as within a map, but most likely along multiple, local
reference frames (Meilinger et al., 2013).
Participants performed two blocks of 30 trials each in walk and
bird perspective with the order of perspectives counterbalanced
between participants. Within a block the progression of trials was
the following: participants were teleported to a start location,
indicted the routes to several target locations (seven targets for
two of the four start locations, and eight targets on the other
two start locations) and then proceeded to the next start location.
The order of start locations and target locations at a single start
location were chosen randomly for each participant and block.
After the experiment, participants indicated the routes entered
before into paper maps of Tübingen. For every participant,
his/her individual drawn routes were used as the reference relative
to determine the individual errors in the entered sequences.
Reported errors compared the number of required turns, or
straight walking, with how often such commands were entered.
Errors were omissions (coded as negative errors, e.g., entering
fewer turns as required), insertions (coded as positive errors, e.g.,
entering more turns as required) and wrong turning direction
(i.e., too many left or right turns). Turning direction did not show
any effect and is irrelevant for the current analysis. Deviations
from required straights and turns do not consider errors in route
order, for example, typing left–right instead of right–left. Lev-
enshtein or “edit” distance (Levenshtein, 1966) does so to some
extent: it estimates the minimum number of sequence elements
to be altered, inserted, or erased in order to obtain the reference
sequence from the entered sequence. Usually, different possibil-
ities of alteration exist, so errors are still difficult to attribute to
individual intersections. Analyzing our data by Levenshtein dis-
tances vs. the absolute number of errors (Levenshtein distances do
not consider over- vs. underestimation), we observed very similar
effects. We thus conclude that route order errors were not central.
For the entered route decisions, we compared latencies
between turns and straight walking. Trials with error or latency
data deviating more than three standard deviations from the
overall mean and trials with wrongly mapped starting or goal
locations within the maps were excluded from analysis (13%,
i.e., 186 trials). Participants’ individual error or latency means
were submitted to an ANOVA, with the within participant fac-
tors “intersection” (straight vs. turns) and “perspective” (walk
vs. bird), as well as the between-participants factor “perspective
order” (bird first vs. walk first). There were no gender differences,
therefore, pooled data is reported.
RESULTS
Errors in route recall mainly consisted of omission errors. Par-
ticipants on average missed 6.7 or 45% of the intersections per
trial. Entered sequences were shorter than correct sequences,
t(22) = 14.6, p < 0.001. As shown in Figure 2, forgetting differed
substantially between the types of intersections. Participants on
average missed 5.77 or 60% straight walking intersections per
trial, but only 0.96 or 23% turns. This was clearly less often,
F(1,21) = 135, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.87, even when analyzing percent
instead of number of omissions, F(1,21) = 53.1, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.72. Consistent with a “when in doubt follow your nose”
strategy, this suggests that participants preferably focused on
turning intersections also in highly familiar environments.
The difference in errors (turns vs. straight) was larger in the
bird perspective than in the walking perspective as indicated by
the interaction perspective × intersection type, F(1,21) = 15.11,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.42. Participants forgot more straight than
turn intersections in bird perspective, F(1,21) = 15.6, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.43, which was less pronounced and only indicated by a
trend in walk perspective, F(1,21) = 3.04, p = 0.096, η2p = 0.13. The
general advantage in reporting from walk perspective is discussed
elsewhere (Meilinger et al., 2013). Please note that participants
on average entered straight walking 3.6 times per route which is
roughly comparable to the 3.2 turns per route, F(1,21) = 1.44,
p = 0.243, η2p = 0.06. As the selected routes typically required
more straight walking decisions the errors in straight walking
were higher.
Prior evidence for the “when in doubt follow your nose” strat-
egy showed not only diminished recall of straight walking inter-
sections, but also better performance when indicating straight
FIGURE 2 | Omission errors (negative numbers) and insertion errors
(positive numbers) per trial at turning and straight walking
intersections. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean as estimated
from the marginal means.
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Table 1 | Means and between participant standard errors in seconds
for indicating straight walking and turning as a function of test
perspective.
Intersection type Walk perspective Bird perspective
M SE M SE
Straight 2.41 0.22 2.52 0.22
Turn 2.60 0.21 2.55 0.20
walking as compared to turning. The same pattern is also shown
in the present data. There was a general trend for participants to
more quickly indicate straight walking as compared with turning,
F(1,21) = 3.00, p = 0.10, η2p = 0.12, which was significant for walk
perspective, F(1,21) = 7.41, p = 0.012, η2p = 0.25, but not bird
perspective, F< 1 (see Table 1). There was no interaction between
perspective and intersection type, F(1,21) = 2.31, p = 0.14,
η2p = 0.10.
DISCUSSION
Participants mainly forgot to indicate straight walking as com-
pared with turns, but for the reported intersections participants
were quicker at indicating straight walking than turns. Related
work examining newly learned routes found the same tradeoff
pattern of better recall for turns, but higher performance for
indication straight walking at an intersection (Meilinger et al.,
2012). This pattern is consistent with the “when in doubt follow
your nose” strategy first described for exploring novel envi-
ronments by Dalton (2003), and applied to route memory by
Meilinger et al. (2012). This strategy proposes that participants
by default walk straight. Therefore, they are not required to
memorize straight walking intersections and can only memo-
rize turns, thus reducing memory load. Consequently, naviga-
tors will report more turns than straight walking intersections.
However, when indicating route decisions, the default strat-
egy of walking straight will facilitate the indicating of straight
walking as this is the behavioral default and thus more eas-
ily executed. While this pattern was shown before for learn-
ing unfamiliar routes, the present results extend these findings
toward a highly familiar environment, from visually learning by
video toward learning by navigating the real world, and from
route learning to route planning. The “when in doubt follow
your nose” strategy seems to be applied in a wide variety of
situations.
The higher omission rate, but quicker reactions for straight
walking as compared with turns was qualified by the perspective
from which the task was conducted. On the one hand, omission
rate difference between intersections was larger when partici-
pants answered from an imagined bird perspective. On the other
hand, quicker reactions for straight walking were only found
in walk perspective. Again, this parallels results from the prior
route learning study where higher omission rates for straight
walking were found in a bird’s eye perspective task (i.e., map
drawing), but not a horizontal task (i.e., recognizing intersection
pictures). In contrast, better performance in route continuation
at straight intersections was observed in walk perspective tasks
(i.e., in navigating the route and in indicating route continua-
tion from intersection pictures) although route continuation was
not tested from bird perspective. From our point of view, the
dependence on walk perspective for the better performance in
indicating straight route continuations vs. turns, originates from
body based reference frames. Default reactions executed more
often can be performed quicker or more accurately than other
reactions (Anderson, 2000). For the case of navigating straight this
is body-relative. It can be expressed by walking straight, flexing a
joystick to the front, or by pressing the straight ahead/up arrow
key, yielding advantages observed within the two experiments.
However, when answering from bird perspective straight ahead
meant keeping the same walking direction which most often
did not coincide with bodily front. After turning eastward, for
example, by pressing the right arrow key, straight walking had
to be indicated by pressing the right arrow key again as this was
the same direction in bird perspective. This was not along the
bodily front and we speculate that this was the reason why we
did not observe a straight walking advantage in that perspective.
Support for the advantage of bodily front comes from pointing
experiments where there is an observed advantage of pointing
to the bodily front as compared with the pointing to the back
(Sholl, 1987, 1999). Future experimentation has to clarify this
issue.
Omission errors occur more frequently at straight than at turn
intersections. This difference was stronger in bird perspective than
in walk perspective. We are hesitant to state that the difference
is only to be found in bird perspective. In walk perspective
there was a trend for more omission errors as well. While a
trend does not qualify as a statistical reliable difference, it is
also no argument to suggest that there is no difference at all.
From our point of view it is quite possible that power was not
sufficient to find a smaller effect in walk perspective. Never-
theless, the significant interaction suggests that the effect was
clearly stronger in the bird than in walk perspective. Why would
this be the case? We think we can exclude the possibility that
participants used map-based knowledge in the vertical perspec-
tive, and navigation based knowledge in the walk perspective.
The prior data analysis of the same data used here (Meilinger
et al., 2013) suggests that route errors and latencies from both
perspectives were completely unrelated to map-acquired pointing
errors in parallelized pointing tasks. Such a correlation should
have been present if route testing from bird perspective was
map-based. Together with the observed advantage in answer-
ing from walk perspective vs. bird perspective the data suggests
that participants’ route sequences were derived from multiple
local reference frames likely acquired from navigation. When
answering from bird perspective, participants had to transform
these reference frames into bird perspective first. This transfor-
mation puts an additional load on participants. As pointed out
in the following paragraphs we think that the preference for
turns results from limited working memory. Additional work-
ing memory load due to perspective transformations will then
foster the observed concentration on turns observed in the
interaction.
In learning unfamiliar routes, the “when in doubt follow your
nose” strategy affected long-term memory storage (Meilinger
et al., 2012). Turning intersections were recalled more accurately
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than straight walking intersections. In the present study, better
memory for turning intersections might have originated from
two sources: better long-term memory for turns or alternatively
loading preferable turns from long-term memory into working
memory when selecting the route to the goal. We cannot differen-
tiate between these alternatives based on the given data. However,
in the light of other work, the interpretation on working memory
seems more plausible as pointed out in the following.
One argument that long-term memory does not primarily
consist of turns states that within ones city of residency all
intersections can be sufficiently familiar. Long-term memory is
not considered as limited in capacity (Anderson, 2000). With
sufficient training, large information sets can be learned and
our long-term inhabitants had years of daily experience to learn
the whole environment. While it might not make sense to learn
every driveway, gateway, dead-end, or small back road, exactly
these were excluded in the present study as participants only
focused on streets providing an alternative route to the goal.
Furthermore, participants chose routes themselves, so one can
expect them to only have selected familiar routes and prior testing
ensured familiarity with the start and goal locations before the
experiment. All these points suggest that participants could in
principle be familiar with all intersections, not just a subset of
them.
Another argument against long-term memory priority for
turns follows from the structure of route memory. It is highly
unlikely that participants memorized only individual routes
and selected the route from that pool. The number of poten-
tial routes through a city is just too large to memorize them
one by one. Consequently, models of route knowledge con-
sider networks or graphs of locations connected via paths from
which routes can be selected flexibly (Poucet, 1993; Trullier
et al., 1997; Werner et al., 2000; Meilinger, 2008; Mallot and
Basten, 2009). These conceptions were also supported empir-
ically (Chrastil and Warren, 2014). However, within such a
graph, one and the same intersection can be a turn on one
route, but a straight walking intersection on another one. Omit-
ting memory for one intersection may omit a straight walk-
ing intersection on one route, but a turning intersection at
another route also within the present experiment. Consequently,
a decision point within a network cannot be assigned to turn-
ing or straight walking. It is, therefore, not very plausible that
straight walking intersections were not present in long-term
memory.
Omitting straight walking intersections from long-term mem-
ory is not plausible. However, omitting them from working mem-
ory during route planning is plausible. Working memory capacity
is limited (Anderson, 2000), therefore, concentrating on turns
can reduce memory load. This can be especially important when
the working memory content has to be transformed. As pointed
out before, testing from bird perspective involved transforming
intersections from walk perspective (i.e., the format of long-
term storage) into bird perspective within working memory. Such
additional working memory load will enhance the concentration
on turns compared with testing from walk perspective where no
additional load is present. Working memory limitations can thus
explain the observed perspective differences. Limited working
memory resources can be interpreted as attentional focus (Kane
and Engle, 2002). In that sense participants only attended a
subset of intersections during planning—the ones within working
memory. The “when in doubt follow your nose” strategy allowed
navigators to limit this focus on turns. Please note, there is hardly
any “doubt” at an intersection when planning a route. It is more
the question of which intersections are attended in working mem-
ory rather than about if all intersections are considered and some
are doubted. One might argue that participants are not required
to transfer anything into working memory during planning as
they can directly give an answer at an intersection. However, this
seems wrong as they first have to select a route to the goal (or
at least the goal area) before being able to enter route decisions.
Otherwise they would have entered random sequences which
they clearly did not do. Please note that classical search strategies
through a (problem) space also assume limited working memory
and some of them minimize exactly that load (e.g., iterative deep
search; Russell and Norvig, 1995).
Reducing working memory load is also the basis for other
wayfinding strategies. Fine-to-coarse planning (Wiener and Mal-
lot, 2003) does so by planning not the full route, but only the
route toward the goal area first. When reaching the goal area,
the previous route can be discarded from working memory and
the remaining route within the goal area to the target is planned.
The working memory interpretation of the “when in doubt follow
your nose” strategy would draw on exactly the same underlying
reason. This line of argumentation also fits for the strategy of min-
imizing turns (Golledge, 1995). If the “when in doubt follow your
nose” strategy reduces working memory by only representing
turns, memory load can be even further reduced when selecting
a route which consists of as few turns as possible.1 In that sense
all three wayfinding strategies would be grounded in the more
general principle of reducing working memory load. Please note
that these strategies can be applied at the same time.
In summary, we conclude that the higher accuracy of recalling
turning intersections is grounded in working memory. This con-
clusion originates from several arguments: (1) within ones city of
residency all intersections—straight walking and turns—can be
equally familiar, (2) intersections within long-term route memory
are hardly classified as a turn or straight walking, (3) working
memory during planning is necessarily capacity limited and the
“when in doubt follow your nose” strategy can reduce this load,
and (4) other wayfinding strategies also limit working memory
load.
The present pattern was found for planning routes but not
for navigating routes. Hölscher et al. (2011) have shown that
the selected routes when planning before navigation differed
from the routes chosen when actually navigating a route. The
“when in doubt follow your nose” strategy was examined in
actual navigation (Meilinger et al., 2012), however, it was a
situation where paths were given and navigators could not
1The defer path choice strategy (Christenfeld, 1995) which avoids turns as long
as possible or the longest initial segment strategy (Bailenson et al., 2000) of
trying to approach the goal with the longest possible straight route might be
instances of the minimizing turn strategy—although these strategies might in
the end not always select the route with the fewest turns.
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choose their route alternative. As a consequence we do not
know whether results apply to free navigation within a famil-
iar environment. Participants might swap to a applying a least
angle strategy when actually moving through the environment
rather than follow the selected route. Swapping might be more
difficult within Tübingen which has an irregular street pattern
as compared to the center of Freiburg in the Hölscher et al.
(2011) study which roughly follows a grid pattern making the
application of the observed least angle strategy considerably
easier.
Can the higher accuracy in recalling turns be explained by
participants misunderstanding the task, thinking that they are
asked to only report turns? This seems unlikely as we explic-
itly instructed participants to report all intersections including
the straight walking ones. Furthermore, such misunderstanding
would only be plausible if route memory indeed focuses on turns
rather than straight walking intersections, which is exactly what
the “when in doubt follow your nose” strategy states.
Participants showed a lot of omission errors. Even if consider-
ing only omission errors of required turns, participants forgot to
enter one turn per route on average. Does this mean that partic-
ipants are not able to find routes within their city of residency?
We do not think so. The present experiment differed in various
aspects from real navigation. First, decisions were time pressured.
In real life, one can wait and think about the next decision
which will minimize errors. Furthermore, for half of the routes,
participants recalled the routes from a bird’s eye perspective not
encountered within real life. Transforming the route knowledge
into this unusual perspective likely increased the error rate. Most
importantly, participants recalled the routes while remaining at
the start location, i.e., they entered the decisions without any
visual cues except for the start location. Memory performance
with visual cues (e.g., recognition) is typically much better than
without cues (i.e., recall; Anderson, 2000). Consequently, partic-
ipants can be expected to perform much better in real life than
within the present experimental setting.
Just as with newly learned routes, the present results on plan-
ning routes within a familiar space are consistent with a “when in
doubt follow your nose” strategy. Several arguments suggest that
the effect in planning is due to limiting working memory load—
a general principle which can account for several wayfinding
strategies.
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